{"id":583,"date":"2026-09-09T23:19:14","date_gmt":"2026-09-09T23:19:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/?p=583"},"modified":"2026-09-10T11:05:59","modified_gmt":"2026-09-10T11:05:59","slug":"genre-senegal-dispersion-institutionnelle-dgeeg","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/genre-senegal-dispersion-institutionnelle-dgeeg\/","title":{"rendered":"Gender in Senegal: moving beyond institutional fragmentation"},"content":{"rendered":"<\/p>\n
\n

A\u00cfWARA STRATEGY \u2014 GOVERNANCE & PUBLIC POLICY<\/p>\n

Strengthening the national mechanism, clarifying responsibilities and testing the case for a Directorate-General for Equity and Gender Equality.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Mamadou Bassirou K\u00c9B\u00c9<\/strong> \u2014 Founder of A\u00cfWARA \u2014 9 September 2026<\/p>\n

\n
\n
\n
A\u00cfWARA STRATEGY<\/div>\n

Gender in Senegal:
moving beyond institutional fragmentation<\/span><\/h2>\n

Should the DEEG evolve into a Directorate-General for Equity and Gender Equality?<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

Independent analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n

Concrete policy options<\/strong><\/p>\n

For more effective and inclusive public policy<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

From fragmentation to strategic steering<\/p>\n

A clearer public-sector architecture<\/h3>\n
\n
Family policy<\/strong><\/div>\n
Protection of women and girls<\/strong><\/div>\n
Women\u2019s economic empowerment<\/strong><\/div>\n
Territories and local authorities<\/strong><\/div>\n
Sector ministries<\/strong><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
EQUITY & GENDER EQUALITY \u2014 COORDINATION \u2014 RESULTS MONITORING<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
Relevance \u00b7 Coherence \u00b7 Effectiveness \u00b7 Efficiency<\/div>\n<\/section>\n

The workshop announced for 11 September 2026 on Senegal\u2019s second National Action Plan to combat gender-based violence provides a concrete entry point into a much older problem: the dispersion of public responsibilities across several structures working on family policy, gender equality, violence against women and women\u2019s economic empowerment. The issue should not be reduced to rivalry between administrative departments. It raises a classic public-management question: how should a cross-cutting policy be organised so that it is clear who leads it, who implements it, who is accountable for it and at what cost?<\/p>\n

\n

Key points<\/h2>\n
    \n
  • Overlapping mandates are visible both in the ministry\u2019s organisational texts and in the official mid-term evaluation of SNEEG 2.<\/li>\n
  • The core problem is less the number of structures than the absence of a sufficiently strong centre of strategic steering capable of organising functions that are currently dispersed.<\/li>\n
  • The criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency raise a legitimate question about keeping the DEEG at the level of an ordinary directorate when its mandate is national and cross-sectoral.<\/li>\n
  • A Directorate-General for Equity and Gender Equality would make sense only as a consolidation measure: it should neither absorb the sectoral responsibilities of other ministries nor simply add another administrative layer.<\/li>\n
  • Reform should at the same time strengthen a genuine national family policy, clarify GBV leadership, better organise women\u2019s economic empowerment and reinforce the interministerial gender-governance mechanism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/section>\n

    1. A workshop that reveals a deeper institutional problem<\/h2>\n

    The announcement of an institutional validation workshop for the second National Action Plan to eliminate gender-based violence, led by the Directorate for Family, may appear surprising given that the Directorate for Equity and Gender Equality (DEEG) is the national mechanism for coordinating gender policy and already leads several national arrangements for GBV prevention and response. But it would be too simplistic to conclude that one department has merely encroached on another\u2019s remit.<\/p>\n

    The overlap is partly produced by the legal framework itself. Decree No. 2023-1038 of 16 May 2023 assigns family policy to the Directorate for Family and Protection of Vulnerable Groups, while also assigning it responsibility for protecting women against all forms of violence. The same decree entrusts the DEEG with the development of gender equality and equity policies, gender mainstreaming across sector policies, and the coordination and monitoring of interventions promoting equality between women and men. A third body, the Directorate for Women\u2019s Economic Empowerment (DAEF), is mandated to implement empowerment policies, promote women\u2019s entrepreneurship and coordinate training and financing interventions.<\/p>\n

    The problem is therefore institutional before it is relational. When two or three structures can reasonably rely on official texts to intervene in relation to the same public-policy outcome, coordination becomes overly dependent on individuals, projects and administrative power relations. A sound public-sector architecture should reduce precisely this type of dependency.<\/p>\n

    2. Fragmentation is already documented<\/h2>\n

    The mid-term evaluation of SNEEG 2, finalised in 2023, removes much of the subjectivity from the debate. The report identifies fragmented interventions, weak coordination, non-functioning governance bodies, limited resources for the national mechanism and overlapping actions targeting the same results. It goes further: when similar interventions are not coordinated, they lead to ineffective and inefficient use of resources.<\/p>\n

    This finding usefully reframes the issue. The question is no longer which directorate has the stronger administrative claim. It is whether the current organisation enables the State to achieve coherent results with the resources it mobilises. The official evaluation already provides part of the answer: coordination mechanisms are insufficient and interventions remain too fragmented.<\/p>\n

    It is also important to distinguish administrative concepts that use the same vocabulary while referring to different objectives. The Directorate-General for Community Development and the Promotion of Equity addresses social and territorial equity; it is not the mechanism responsible for gender equity and gender equality. This distinction is essential to avoid treating terminological proximity as institutional duplication.<\/p>\n

    3. What public-organisation theory tells us<\/h2>\n

    Senegal\u2019s case is not unusual. Public administrations often accumulate structures over time as political priorities, reforms, programmes and funding arrangements evolve. A new mandate is added, a project becomes a unit, a directorate is created or renamed, yet previous functions do not always disappear. This layering gradually blurs lines of responsibility.<\/p>\n

    Max Weber placed clearly defined competencies and hierarchical responsibility at the heart of rational-legal administration. The contemporary relevance is straightforward: a public organisation is difficult to steer when several units hold closely related mandates without a sufficiently clear authority to arbitrate between them.<\/p>\n

    Henry Mintzberg offers a second insight. Specialisation always creates a need for coordination. The greater the number of specialised units, the more an organisation needs mechanisms capable of integrating them around shared objectives. Specialisation is not itself the problem; it becomes one when liaison, planning and arbitration mechanisms fail to keep pace.<\/p>\n

    New Public Management, particularly associated with Christopher Hood, emphasised managerial accountability and measurable results. Yet reforms inspired by organisational disaggregation also revealed limits: too many autonomous units can increase transaction costs and fragment public action. Whole-of-government approaches, analysed notably by Tom Christensen and Per L\u00e6greid, emerged partly in response to this problem: cross-cutting challenges cannot be governed effectively through silos alone.<\/p>\n

    Gender policy clearly belongs to this category. It intersects with public finance, justice, health, education, employment, agriculture, social protection, local government, statistics and international commitments. The ministry responsible for family policy cannot implement everything itself; the national mechanism must instead have the capacity to bring together all those who must act.<\/p>\n

    4. Four criteria for assessing the current architecture<\/h2>\n

    Institutional relevance<\/h3>\n

    Is the DEEG\u2019s administrative level proportionate to the breadth of its mandate? SNEEG is Senegal\u2019s national reference framework for gender and seeks to institutionalise gender equality across public institutions. The DEEG must therefore work beyond its host ministry, engage other departments, support gender focal mechanisms, contribute to budgeting and data systems, and respond to international commitments. Keeping this function at an insufficient administrative level mechanically weakens its capacity to drive action. Moving towards a directorate-general therefore raises a question of relevance: aligning the institutional level of the mechanism with the actual scope of its mission.<\/p>\n

    Coherence of mandates<\/h3>\n

    Coherence does not mean that one structure should do everything. It means that functions should be organised clearly. Strategy and standards, coordination, financing, data collection and service delivery do not necessarily require the same operator. At present, these functions intersect across the DEEG, the Directorate for Family, the DAEF, CENAF, projects and sectoral mechanisms. Reform should first make these boundaries explicit.<\/p>\n

    Organisational effectiveness<\/h3>\n

    Effectiveness is the capacity to achieve expected results. The SNEEG evaluation explicitly links performance difficulties to weak coordination, limited resources for the national mechanism and insufficient functioning of governance bodies. Strengthening the DEEG should therefore not be treated as a matter of administrative prestige. It should enable better coordination of results, more reliable monitoring and more stable technical authority.<\/p>\n

    Administrative efficiency<\/h3>\n

    Efficiency requires attention to both the visible and hidden costs of fragmentation: dispersed budgets, repetitive meetings, similar studies, parallel data systems, multiple reporting requirements, time spent negotiating mandates and difficulty assigning responsibility for results. It would nevertheless be premature to claim savings before measuring them. A functional and budgetary audit should therefore precede reform. A DGEEG would be efficient only if it consolidates, pools or realigns existing functions rather than adding new ones.<\/p>\n

    5. A DGEEG as a consolidation option<\/h2>\n

    Upgrading the DEEG to a directorate-general can be justified only if there is clarity about what the new structure should be \u2014 and what it should not become.<\/p>\n

    Its role would be to serve as the technical centre for strategic steering of national gender policy: preparing and monitoring the national framework, mainstreaming gender across public policy, supporting gender and equity focal mechanisms, coordinating the national GBV framework, consolidating statistics and monitoring and evaluation, following international commitments, engaging development partners and steering the policy framework for women\u2019s economic empowerment.<\/p>\n

    It should not become a ministry within a ministry, nor should it replace the responsibilities of Justice, Health, Interior, Education, Social Action or Child Protection. For GBV, for example, national coordination and monitoring of a results framework could fall within the DGEEG\u2019s remit, while investigation, prosecution, health care, social protection, shelter and case support remain with the competent institutions.<\/p>\n

    One distinction is essential: upgrading the DEEG to a directorate-general would not give it hierarchical authority over other ministries. Cross-government action therefore requires a second tier of governance: a high-level interministerial mechanism capable of arbitrating issues that exceed the mandate of the host ministry, with the DGEEG serving as its technical secretariat.<\/p>\n

    The same principle applies to economic empowerment. The DGEEG should ensure policy coherence, targeting standards, results measurement and alignment with SNEEG. It should not become the single operational gateway for all financing mechanisms.<\/p>\n

    6. Giving family policy its own strategic centre of gravity<\/h2>\n

    Restructuring gender governance should not be interpreted as stripping responsibilities from the Directorate for Family. On the contrary, it offers an opportunity to give national family policy greater strategic substance.<\/p>\n

    Senegal is experiencing rapid social change: urbanisation, mobility, changing solidarity systems, single-parent households, ageing, poverty and vulnerability, migration, work-family balance, children\u2019s exposure to digital environments, new forms of vulnerability and pressures on intergenerational solidarity. A strong Directorate for Family has ample scope to develop a distinct public policy linked to social protection, child policy, education, health and local government.<\/p>\n

    The choice is therefore not between family policy and gender policy. The objective is to prevent a directorate responsible for the family from becoming dispersed across missions already structured by the national gender mechanism, while national family policy itself remains insufficiently consolidated.<\/p>\n

    7. Stakeholders and the political economy of reform<\/h2>\n

    Institutional reform is never merely an organisational chart. It redistributes visibility, responsibilities, budgets, relationships with partners and administrative positions. Success therefore depends as much on stakeholder management as on the technical quality of the proposed architecture.<\/p>\n

    The first circle includes the Presidency, the Prime Minister\u2019s Office, the General Secretariat of Government and the Bureau Organisation et M\u00e9thodes, which are responsible for arbitration and overall coherence of administrative structures. The second brings together the relevant ministry\u2019s internal bodies: DEEG, the Directorate for Family, DAEF, the General Secretariat, CENAF, social-action services, child-protection services and decentralised structures. The third is interministerial: Finance, Justice, Health, Interior, Education, Labour, Agriculture, local authorities and other sectors in which gender must be mainstreamed. The fourth includes technical and financial partners, civil-society organisations, women\u2019s organisations, researchers and territorial actors.<\/p>\n

    The main risk is that a DGEEG project could be perceived as one directorate expanding its administrative territory at the expense of others. Reform must therefore be framed for what it should be: clarification of State responsibilities. The audit should focus on functions and results, not individuals. Development partners should likewise progressively align projects, data systems and results frameworks with a single national architecture.<\/p>\n

    8. Three possible trajectories to 2030<\/h2>\n

    The following scenarios are not forecasts. They are a way of testing the consequences of different institutional choices through to 2030.<\/p>\n

    \n
    \n
    A\u00cfWARA STRATEGY<\/div>\n

    Three institutional trajectories to 2030<\/h3>\n

    What could each option mean for the coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of gender policy?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

    \n
    \n
    01<\/div>\n

    Maintain the current architecture<\/h4>\n

    Status quo \/ continuing fragmentation<\/p>\n

    Architecture<\/strong>
    Existing structures and overlapping mandates remain in place.<\/p>\n

    Advantage<\/strong>
    Institutional stability and limited transition costs.<\/p>\n

    Risk<\/strong>
    Persistent fragmentation and high coordination costs.<\/p>\n

    Likely performance by 2030<\/strong>
    Low<\/span><\/p>\n<\/article>\n

    \n
    02<\/div>\n

    Strengthen coordination without restructuring<\/h4>\n

    Better connect the existing system<\/p>\n

    Architecture<\/strong>
    Stronger coordination bodies, protocols and shared tools.<\/p>\n

    Advantage<\/strong>
    Better synergy without a major organisational reform.<\/p>\n

    Risk<\/strong>
    Dependence on political will and possible loss of momentum over time.<\/p>\n

    Likely performance by 2030<\/strong>
    Medium<\/span><\/p>\n<\/article>\n

    \n
    03<\/div>\n

    Consolidate around a DGEEG<\/h4>\n

    Stronger strategic steering, subject to safeguards<\/p>\n

    Architecture<\/strong>
    DGEEG as the technical centre for strategic steering, backed by high-level interministerial arbitration.<\/p>\n

    Advantage<\/strong>
    Clearer responsibilities and stronger steering and monitoring capacity.<\/p>\n

    Risk<\/strong>
    An additional bureaucratic layer if reform is not preceded by a functional audit and real consolidation.<\/p>\n

    Likely performance by 2030<\/strong>
    High, subject to conditions<\/span><\/p>\n<\/article>\n<\/div>\n

    A\u00cfWARA assessment.<\/strong> Scenario 3 offers the strongest potential for institutional coherence, subject to confirmation through functional, legal, budgetary and human-resources audits.<\/div>\n<\/section>\n

    Scenario 1 \u2014 Continued institutional layering<\/h3>\n

    The structures remain unchanged and overlapping responsibilities are managed case by case. Each project develops its own coordination arrangements, indicators and partnerships. In the short term, the administration avoids the political cost of reform. Over time, accountability for results remains diffuse, partners continue to negotiate with several counterparts, and SNEEG implementation depends heavily on the quality of relations between departments. This is the least disruptive scenario, but it is also the one that reproduces the weaknesses already documented in 2023.<\/p>\n

    Scenario 2 \u2014 Coordination without restructuring<\/h3>\n

    Administrative orders, protocols and committees clarify roles without changing the organisational architecture. This option can quickly strengthen leadership of the GBV action plan and improve information flows. Its advantage is its relatively low cost. Its weakness is institutional: protocols cannot permanently correct differences in administrative rank, overlapping mandates set out in decrees, or the fragmentation of data, monitoring and empowerment functions.<\/p>\n

    Scenario 3 \u2014 Consolidation around a DGEEG<\/h3>\n

    The DEEG becomes a directorate-general through the consolidation of existing functions. The Directorate for Family is refocused and strengthened around family policy; women\u2019s economic empowerment is placed within a clearer policy chain; the national GBV framework has an identifiable strategic lead; data and monitoring and evaluation functions are consolidated; and a high-level interministerial mechanism arbitrates cross-cutting issues. This scenario has the strongest performance potential, but it also carries a risk: if reform simply adds a new directorate-general without removing or realigning duplicated functions, it will deepen the bureaucracy it seeks to correct.<\/p>\n

    9. Safeguards for a useful reform<\/h2>\n
      \n
    • Conduct functional, legal, budgetary and human-resources audits before adopting a new organisational chart, including an assessment of duplication and coordination costs.<\/li>\n
    • Adopt a decree that clearly distinguishes four functions: strategy and standards; coordination; financing; and service delivery.<\/li>\n
    • Create the DGEEG through consolidation rather than simple superposition, pooling data, studies, planning and monitoring functions where appropriate.<\/li>\n
    • Place the interministerial mechanism at a level capable of genuine government-wide arbitration, with the DGEEG acting as its technical secretariat.<\/li>\n
    • Finalise and finance a national family policy with measurable results, giving the Directorate for Family a clear strategic field of responsibility.<\/li>\n
    • Establish a single monitoring framework for gender policy and the national GBV action plan, fed by ministries and territorial actors and progressively used by technical and financial partners.<\/li>\n
    • Evaluate reform after twelve to eighteen months, assessing not merely the new organisational chart but its effects on decision times, coordination costs, data quality and results for citizens and service users.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      10. What the policy decision must actually determine<\/h2>\n

      The debate over a Directorate-General for Equity and Gender Equality should not be reduced to administrative rank. It concerns the doctrine of public action itself: can a cross-cutting policy continue to be governed as though it were a sector policy? How can responsibility be assigned clearly for an outcome that depends on several ministries? How can project financing be prevented from generating as many coordination systems as there are programmes? And how can family policy, gender equality, GBV and women\u2019s economic empowerment be given sufficiently clear mandates to cooperate without becoming indistinguishable?<\/p>\n

      In light of the legal framework, the SNEEG evaluation and lessons from public-management theory, the evolution of the DEEG into a DGEEG is an option that merits serious policy arbitration. Its relevance, however, depends entirely on the method adopted: it should be the outcome of restructuring, not the starting point of a new layer of administrative sedimentation.<\/p>\n

      The true measure of success will therefore not be the creation of a new acronym. It will be the State\u2019s ability to answer four simple questions: who leads? who acts? who is accountable? and do the resources committed produce better results?<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n

      Sources and references<\/h2>\n
        \n
      1. Republic of Senegal, Decree No. 2026-1149 of 11 June 2026 on the responsibilities of the Minister for Family, Social Action and Solidarity.<\/li>\n
      2. Republic of Senegal, Decree No. 2023-1038 of 16 May 2023 organising the Ministry for Women, Family and Child Protection, in particular Articles 23\u201327.<\/li>\n
      3. Republic of Senegal, Decree No. 2008-1045 of 15 September 2008 creating and establishing the organisation and functioning of the National Directorate for Equity and Gender Equality.<\/li>\n
      4. Directorate for Equity and Gender Equality, Mid-term Evaluation of SNEEG 2<\/em>, final report, October 2023.<\/li>\n
      5. Directorate for Equity and Gender Equality, technical note on the DEEG and SNEEG.<\/li>\n
      6. OECD evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.<\/li>\n
      7. Max Weber, Economy and Society<\/em>, work on bureaucracy and rational-legal authority.<\/li>\n
      8. Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations<\/em>, 1979; Structure in Fives<\/em>, 1983.<\/li>\n
      9. Christopher Hood, \u201cA Public Management for All Seasons?\u201d, Public Administration<\/em>, 1991.<\/li>\n
      10. Tom Christensen & Per L\u00e6greid, work on whole-of-government approaches and post-New Public Management reforms.<\/li>\n
      11. United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Chapter IV.H, institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/section>\n

        Editorial note.<\/strong> A\u00cfWARA provides the editorial and methodological framework for this publication. The analysis, interpretations and recommendations are the responsibility of the author.<\/p>\n<\/article>\n

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