{"id":635,"date":"2026-09-13T17:02:27","date_gmt":"2026-09-13T17:02:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/?p=635"},"modified":"2026-09-13T23:10:18","modified_gmt":"2026-09-13T23:10:18","slug":"gouvernance-des-droits-et-de-la-protection-de-lenfant-au-senegal","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/gouvernance-des-droits-et-de-la-protection-de-lenfant-au-senegal\/","title":{"rendered":"Gouvernance des droits et de la protection de l\u2019enfant au S\u00e9n\u00e9gal"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<\/p>\n<style>\nhtml[lang='en-GB'] .wp-block-post-title{display:none!important}\n.aiwara-en h2{font-family:Georgia,serif;color:#0b3153;font-size:clamp(27px,4.5vw,39px);line-height:1.2;margin:48px 0 18px}\n.aiwara-en h3{font-family:Georgia,serif;color:#0b3153;font-size:clamp(22px,3.6vw,29px);line-height:1.25;margin:34px 0 14px}\n.aiwara-en blockquote{background:#f3f7fa;border-left:6px solid #e8792e;margin:30px 0;padding:22px 24px;border-radius:0 12px 12px 0}\n.aiwara-en table{border-collapse:collapse;width:100%;min-width:760px;font-size:15px;line-height:1.45}\n.aiwara-en th{background:#0b3153;color:#fff;text-align:left;padding:12px;border:1px solid #d7e0e8}\n.aiwara-en td{padding:11px;border:1px solid #d7e0e8;vertical-align:top}\n.aiwara-en tbody tr:nth-child(even){background:#f6f8fa}\n.aiwara-en .matrix{overflow-x:auto;margin:28px 0 34px;-webkit-overflow-scrolling:touch}\n.aiwara-en .visual{background:#f7f8fa;border:1px solid #dce3e8;border-radius:14px;padding:22px;margin:30px 0;box-shadow:0 8px 24px rgba(11,49,83,.08)}\n.aiwara-en .visual h3{font-family:Arial,sans-serif;font-size:23px;margin:0 0 6px;text-align:center}\n.aiwara-en .visual .sub{font-size:15px;text-align:center;color:#536170;margin:0 0 18px}\n.aiwara-en .cards{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(145px,1fr));gap:10px}\n.aiwara-en .card{background:#fff;border-top:4px solid #e8792e;border-radius:9px;padding:13px;font-size:15px;line-height:1.35;text-align:center}\n.aiwara-en .bar{background:#0b3153;color:#fff;border-radius:9px;padding:14px;text-align:center;font-weight:700;margin:10px 0}\n.aiwara-en .arrow{color:#e8792e;font-size:28px;text-align:center;line-height:1}\n@media(max-width:600px){.aiwara-en{font-size:17px!important}.aiwara-en .visual{padding:16px}.aiwara-en table{font-size:14px}}\n<\/style>\n<article class=\"aiwara-en\" style=\"max-width:920px;margin:0 auto;color:#172033;font-size:18px;line-height:1.75\">\n<section style=\"background:#0b3153;color:#fff;padding:22px 24px;border-radius:12px;border-bottom:6px solid #e8792e;margin:0 0 28px\">\n<p style=\"color:#ffb06f;font-size:13px;font-weight:800;letter-spacing:1.15px;margin:0 0 12px\">A\u00cfWARA STRATEGY \u00b7 GOVERNANCE &amp; PUBLIC POLICY<\/p>\n<h1 style=\"color:#fff;font-family:Georgia,serif;font-size:clamp(32px,6vw,52px);line-height:1.12;margin:0 0 16px\">Governance of child rights and child protection in Senegal<\/h1>\n<p style=\"color:#fff;font-family:Georgia,serif;font-size:clamp(23px,4.5vw,36px);line-height:1.25;margin:0\">From institutional fragmentation to an integrated, effective and accountable system<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<p><strong>Mamadou KEBE<\/strong><br \/>\n<em>Child rights and child protection expert, public policy analyst and<br \/>\nfounder of A\u00cfWARA \u2014 September 2026<\/em><\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Key finding<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The comparison of institutional scenarios supports transforming the<br \/>\ncurrent Directorate for the Promotion of Child Rights and Child<br \/>\nProtection (DPDPE) into a <strong>Directorate-General for the Promotion<br \/>\nof Child Rights and Child Protection<\/strong>, subject to a functional,<br \/>\norganisational and budgetary audit. The purpose is not to add another<br \/>\nadministrative layer. It is to equip the State with an identifiable<br \/>\ncentre of strategic leadership able to steer a multisectoral policy,<br \/>\nconsolidate results and account for them, without removing sector<br \/>\nministries\u2019 responsibilities.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This article examines the normative framework, administrative<br \/>\narchitecture, programme-based budgeting, coordination mechanisms, data<br \/>\nsystems and partnerships as interdependent components of child-rights<br \/>\ngovernance. It shows that institutional plurality becomes problematic<br \/>\nwhen sector specialisation is not matched by sufficient capacity for<br \/>\npolicy coherence, arbitration, continuity of services and<br \/>\naccountability. Five criteria \u2014 relevance, coherence, effectiveness,<br \/>\nefficiency and accountability \u2014 are used to compare four scenarios: a<br \/>\nstrengthened status quo, a strengthened interministerial mechanism, a<br \/>\ndirectorate-general and a national agency.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Keywords<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Child rights; child protection; public governance; intersectoral<br \/>\ncoordination; programme-based budgeting; accountability; institutional<br \/>\nreform; Senegal.<\/p>\n<h2\nid=\"1-a-cross-cutting-policy-without-a-sufficiently-clear-centre-of-strategic-leadership\">1.<br \/>\nA cross-cutting policy without a sufficiently clear centre of strategic<br \/>\nleadership<\/h2>\n<p>Policies concerning children present a structural paradox. Children\u2019s<br \/>\nrights are universal, indivisible and interdependent, yet their<br \/>\nimplementation involves a wide range of specialised public<br \/>\nadministrations. Education and health do not operate through the same<br \/>\nchain of command; juvenile justice follows requirements different from<br \/>\nthose governing social services; civil registration, security, social<br \/>\nprotection, early childhood development and territorial administration<br \/>\neach have their own institutions and instruments. This plurality is not<br \/>\ninherently dysfunctional. It is a normal consequence of the<br \/>\nmultidimensional nature of children\u2019s rights.<\/p>\n<p>A public-policy problem arises when sector specialisation is no<br \/>\nlonger balanced by sufficiently robust mechanisms for coherence,<br \/>\nstrategic leadership, information-sharing and accountability. The<br \/>\nquestion is then no longer simply whether each sector performs its<br \/>\nmandate, but whether the system as a whole delivers, from the child\u2019s<br \/>\nperspective, a continuum of rights and services. A country may have<br \/>\nnumerous projects, committed professionals and several coordination<br \/>\nmechanisms while responsibilities, financing, data and results remain<br \/>\nfragmented.<\/p>\n<p>This concern is supported by a recent external assessment. In its<br \/>\nFebruary 2024 concluding observations, the Committee on the Rights of<br \/>\nthe Child called on Senegal to ensure that the National Intersectoral<br \/>\nCommittee for Child Protection coordinates all activities relating to<br \/>\nimplementation of the Convention across the relevant services at<br \/>\nnational, regional and local levels and is provided with adequate<br \/>\nresources. The Committee also identified shortcomings in resourcing,<br \/>\nbudget traceability and coordinated data collection (Committee on the<br \/>\nRights of the Child, 2024, paras. 8\u201310). These recommendations do not<br \/>\nprescribe a particular administrative form, but they identify governance<br \/>\nfunctions that need to be strengthened.<\/p>\n<p>The purpose of this article is therefore analytical rather than<br \/>\ncorporatist: first, to determine which governance functions are required<br \/>\nto turn a plurality of actors into an integrated system; and second, to<br \/>\nassess which institutional form appears most consistent with those<br \/>\nfunctions. It does not assume that a new structure is desirable in<br \/>\nprinciple. Any reform is justified only if it reduces fragmentation,<br \/>\nclarifies responsibilities and improves outcomes for children.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"2-method-and-analytical-caution\">2. Method and analytical<br \/>\ncaution<\/h2>\n<p>The study draws on documentary, institutional and functional analysis<br \/>\nacross five groups of sources: international and African child-rights<br \/>\ninstruments; official Senegalese documents on administrative<br \/>\norganisation and the National Child Protection Strategy; budget<br \/>\ndocuments; observations issued by the Committee on the Rights of the<br \/>\nChild; and public-management literature on horizontal coordination,<br \/>\nwhole-of-government approaches and network governance. This<br \/>\ntriangulation makes it possible to compare legal standards, formal<br \/>\narchitecture, resources and accountability mechanisms rather than infer<br \/>\nperformance from the organisational chart alone.<\/p>\n<p>One important limitation must be acknowledged. Budget programme 2130<br \/>\nis an aggregate covering family policy, children and social protection<br \/>\nfor vulnerable groups. The public sources reviewed do not provide a<br \/>\nsufficiently detailed and stable breakdown to isolate all expenditure<br \/>\nattributable to children and child protection. This article therefore<br \/>\nmakes no estimate of a \u201cchildren\u2019s budget\u201d. This methodological<br \/>\nrestraint is essential: imperfect visibility within a budget aggregate<br \/>\nshould not be converted into a degree of precision that the available<br \/>\nevidence cannot support.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"3-from-indivisible-rights-to-an-integrated-system\">3. From<br \/>\nindivisible rights to an integrated system<\/h2>\n<p>Indivisibility means that rights cannot be ranked arbitrarily:<br \/>\neducation, health, identity, participation, social protection and<br \/>\nprotection from violence form part of the same body of obligations.<br \/>\nInterdependence means that the realisation of one right directly affects<br \/>\nthe enjoyment of others. Lack of civil registration can restrict access<br \/>\nto school, benefits or justice; school exclusion can increase exposure<br \/>\nto exploitation; and household poverty can amplify several risk factors.<br \/>\nThese principles have a direct consequence for public-policy analysis:<br \/>\nwhile administrations necessarily remain sector-based, governance must<br \/>\nrestore the unity of rights within public decision-making.<\/p>\n<p>This distinction is central to institutional reform. Creating or<br \/>\nstrengthening a strategic leadership body does not mean concentrating<br \/>\nevery competence within it. An integrated system instead depends on<br \/>\nstrong, specialised and accountable sectors connected through a common<br \/>\narchitecture of standards, information, results and accountability.<\/p>\n<section class=\"visual\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"From rights to governance\">\n<h3>From rights to governance<\/h3>\n<p class=\"sub\">Indivisible rights require an integrated public system<\/p>\n<div class=\"cards\">\n<div class=\"card\">Non-discrimination<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Best interests<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Life and development<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Participation<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Protection<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Sector policies<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Protection system<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"arrow\">\u2193<\/div>\n<div class=\"bar\">Governance \u00b7 Leadership \u00b7 Financing \u00b7 Data \u00b7 Territorial delivery \u00b7 Accountability<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<p><em>Figure 1. From the child-rights framework to governance \u2014 Source:<br \/>\nauthor\u2019s analysis based on the Convention on the Rights of the Child,<br \/>\nthe African Charter and UNICEF frameworks.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2\nid=\"4-senegals-institutional-architecture-legitimate-plurality-and-interfaces-to-be-strengthened\">4.<br \/>\nSenegal\u2019s institutional architecture: legitimate plurality and<br \/>\ninterfaces to be strengthened<\/h2>\n<p>Decree No. 2026-1133 of 1 June 2026 provides the current<br \/>\nadministrative reference. Responsibilities concerning children remain<br \/>\ndistributed across several sectors. Within the Ministry of Family,<br \/>\nSocial Action and Solidarity, the Directorate for the Promotion of Child<br \/>\nRights and Child Protection (DPDPE) remains operational in 2026. The<br \/>\nChild Protection Support Unit (CAPE) and the reception, information and<br \/>\nreferral centre for children in difficult circumstances also operate in<br \/>\nthis field. The continued existence of these bodies demonstrates a<br \/>\nspecialised administrative core, but also raises questions about the<br \/>\nprecise allocation of policy development, coordination, implementation,<br \/>\ndata and partnership functions (Republic of Senegal, 2026; APS,<br \/>\n2026).<\/p>\n<p>Within the Ministry of Justice, the Directorate-General for Judicial<br \/>\nand Social Protection (DGPJS) has a strong and specialised architecture.<br \/>\nIts remit includes the protection, rehabilitation and reintegration of<br \/>\nchildren in conflict with the law, victims or witnesses, as well as<br \/>\nchildren and young people at risk. It comprises several directorates,<br \/>\nincluding those responsible for judicial protection, protection<br \/>\ninstitutions and intercountry adoption (Ministry of Justice, 2026). This<br \/>\nstructure is consistent with the specificity of judicial protection, but<br \/>\njudicial protection does not encompass every administrative, social and<br \/>\npreventive dimension of child protection.<\/p>\n<p>The relevant question is therefore not how to eliminate institutional<br \/>\nplurality. It is whether the interfaces are sufficiently organised to<br \/>\nprevent blind spots, duplication, breakdowns in referral and diffusion<br \/>\nof responsibility. Whole-of-government theory emphasises that<br \/>\nmultidimensional problems require a shared strategic vision, coherent<br \/>\npriorities and coordination arrangements capable of operating across<br \/>\nadministrative boundaries (OECD, 2019).<\/p>\n<section class=\"visual\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"An intrinsically multisectoral policy\">\n<h3>An intrinsically multisectoral policy<\/h3>\n<p class=\"sub\">No single administration can deliver all children\u2019s rights<\/p>\n<div class=\"cards\">\n<div class=\"card\">Family and social action<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Justice<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Health<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Education<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Civil registration<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Social protection<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Territorial authorities<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"arrow\">\u2193<\/div>\n<div class=\"bar\">Common standards \u00b7 Shared results \u00b7 Organised interfaces<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<p><em>Figure 2. An intrinsically multisectoral policy \u2014 Source:<br \/>\nauthor\u2019s analysis.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2\nid=\"5-from-coordination-to-strategic-leadership-and-accountability\">5.<br \/>\nFrom coordination to strategic leadership and accountability<\/h2>\n<p>Public-management research shows that the tension between<br \/>\nspecialisation and coordination is structural. Peters argues that<br \/>\nspecialised administration may improve expertise and service quality<br \/>\nwhile generating duplication, inconsistency and growing demands for<br \/>\nhorizontal coordination across government (Peters, 1998, 2015). The aim<br \/>\nis not to remove specialisation, but to establish mechanisms that can<br \/>\ngovern interdependence.<\/p>\n<p>The whole-of-government approach developed in response to the<br \/>\nfragmentation associated with single-purpose organisations and dispersed<br \/>\nresponsibilities. It seeks to restore the State\u2019s capacity to address<br \/>\ncross-cutting problems through shared objectives, coordination<br \/>\nmechanisms and more clearly organised collective responsibility<br \/>\n(Christensen &amp; L\u00e6greid, 2007). Children\u2019s rights are a particularly<br \/>\nrelevant case: their indivisibility makes sector specialisation<br \/>\ninevitable, while their interdependence requires coherent government<br \/>\naction.<\/p>\n<p>Coordination is often presented as the natural answer to<br \/>\ncross-sectoral policy challenges. It is indispensable, but it is not<br \/>\nsufficient. A policy may have committees, commissions, consultation<br \/>\nframeworks and periodic meetings without resolving three deeper<br \/>\nproblems: inconsistent incentives, lack of arbitration authority and<br \/>\nfragmented accountability.<\/p>\n<p>This is not merely a theoretical concern. In 2024, the Committee on<br \/>\nthe Rights of the Child asked the national intersectoral mechanism to<br \/>\ncoordinate effectively all activities related to the Convention at<br \/>\nnational, regional and local levels (para. 8). It also called for<br \/>\nsufficient human, technical and financial resources to be allocated to<br \/>\nthe DPDPE for implementation of the National Child Protection Strategy<br \/>\nand sustainable programmes addressing the root causes of violence and<br \/>\nabuse (para. 21(a)). These recommendations point simultaneously to<br \/>\ninstitutional capacity and coordination authority.<\/p>\n<p>Fragmentation may also affect accountability. Each ministry can<br \/>\nreport on its own activities while no single institution is clearly<br \/>\nanswerable for cross-cutting outcomes: reductions in violence, effective<br \/>\nterritorial coverage, response times, continuity of the child\u2019s pathway<br \/>\nthrough services, service quality or reduced disparities. The governance<br \/>\nchallenge can therefore be framed as follows: who is accountable for<br \/>\naggregate outcomes for children when operational responsibilities are<br \/>\nlegitimately distributed?<\/p>\n<section class=\"visual\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"From fragmentation to integration\">\n<h3>From fragmentation to integration<\/h3>\n<p class=\"sub\">The issue is not the number of actors, but how their responsibilities connect<\/p>\n<div class=\"cards\">\n<div class=\"card\">Fragmented mandates<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Separate financing<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Parallel data<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Broken referrals<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"arrow\">\u2193<\/div>\n<div class=\"bar\">Integrated leadership \u00b7 Shared information \u00b7 Continuity \u00b7 Aggregate accountability<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<p><em>Figure 3. Fragmentation and integration \u2014 Source: author\u2019s<br \/>\nanalysis.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2\nid=\"6-programme-based-budgeting-as-a-test-of-the-accountability-chain\">6.<br \/>\nProgramme-based budgeting as a test of the accountability chain<\/h2>\n<p>The situation changed in 2026. The initial Finance Act identifies<br \/>\nthree programmes within the Ministry of Family, Social Action and<br \/>\nSolidarity. Programme 2130, \u201cFamily, Children and Social Protection for<br \/>\nVulnerable Groups\u201d, receives CFAF 104.178 billion in payment<br \/>\nappropriations. This figure is not a \u201cchildren\u2019s budget\u201d; it is an<br \/>\naggregate covering several policy areas and categories of beneficiaries<br \/>\n(Ministry of Finance and Budget, 2026). By contrast, the 2025 budget<br \/>\nimplementation documents identified a separate \u201cChildren\u201d programme,<br \/>\nmaking the evolution in budget visibility particularly important to<br \/>\nexamine (Ministry of Finance and Budget, 2025).<\/p>\n<p>The need for traceability directly reflects the 2024 concluding<br \/>\nobservations. The Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that<br \/>\nSenegal conduct a comprehensive assessment of budget requirements<br \/>\nconcerning children and establish a budgeting mechanism that clearly<br \/>\nidentifies resources allocated to children across sectors and agencies,<br \/>\nsupported by indicators and a tracking system (Committee on the Rights<br \/>\nof the Child, 2024, para. 9(e)). The budget debate therefore concerns<br \/>\nnot only the level of appropriations, but also the capacity to trace how<br \/>\nthose resources contribute to the realisation of children\u2019s rights.<\/p>\n<p>Budgeting thus becomes a test of governance. A cross-cutting policy<br \/>\nmust be visible not only in official statements and organisational<br \/>\ncharts, but also in programming, indicators and the performance chain.<br \/>\nThe useful question is not simply \u201chow much is being spent?\u201d but \u201ccan<br \/>\nthe resources mobilised be connected to identifiable objectives and to<br \/>\nan authority capable of explaining the results?\u201d<\/p>\n<section class=\"visual\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"What the budget architecture reveals\">\n<h3>What the budget architecture reveals<\/h3>\n<p class=\"sub\">CFAF 104.178 billion in 2026 payment appropriations is an aggregate, not a children\u2019s budget<\/p>\n<div class=\"cards\">\n<div class=\"card\">Family<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Children<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Social protection<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Vulnerable groups<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"arrow\">\u2193<\/div>\n<div class=\"bar\">Trace resources across sectors \u00b7 Connect expenditure to results<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<p><em>Figure 4. What the budget architecture reveals \u2014 The 2026 amount<br \/>\nis an aggregate, not a child-specific budget.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2\nid=\"7-partnerships-and-territorial-delivery-moving-from-projects-to-systems\">7.<br \/>\nPartnerships and territorial delivery: moving from projects to<br \/>\nsystems<\/h2>\n<p>Where national leadership is insufficiently clear, partners may,<br \/>\nwithout intending to fragment public action, finance directorates,<br \/>\nunits, non-governmental organisations, territorial mechanisms or data<br \/>\nsystems separately. Each intervention may be relevant in isolation, yet<br \/>\ntheir cumulative effect may produce competing incentives, parallel<br \/>\ntools, geographical concentration of resources or mechanisms that last<br \/>\nonly as long as a project. The objective must therefore shift from<br \/>\nsupporting juxtaposed structures and projects to strengthening the<br \/>\nnational system.<\/p>\n<p>Alignment must nevertheless be understood within the State\u2019s<br \/>\ninternational obligations. It does not mean automatic adherence to every<br \/>\nadministrative priority. External resources should support nationally<br \/>\ndefined priorities consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the<br \/>\nChild and the African Charter, and should use national results, data and<br \/>\nmonitoring frameworks wherever possible.<\/p>\n<p>Continuity in the child\u2019s pathway through services then becomes a<br \/>\ncomposite indicator of system maturity. Identification, assessment,<br \/>\nreferral, immediate protection, care, judicial intervention where<br \/>\nnecessary, follow-up and reintegration must form a chain. A breakdown<br \/>\nbetween two institutions can negate the quality of the work undertaken<br \/>\nupstream. Governance should therefore assess not only the number of<br \/>\nactivities or structures, but also the functioning of their<br \/>\ninterfaces.<\/p>\n<section class=\"visual\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"Continuity in the child\u2019s pathway\">\n<h3>Continuity in the child\u2019s pathway<\/h3>\n<p class=\"sub\">A practical test of system maturity<\/p>\n<div class=\"cards\">\n<div class=\"card\">Identification<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Assessment<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Referral<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Immediate protection<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Care<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Judicial action<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Follow-up<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Reintegration<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"arrow\">\u2193<\/div>\n<div class=\"bar\">No child should be lost between institutions<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<p><em>Figure 5. Continuity in the child\u2019s pathway as a practical test<br \/>\nof the system \u2014 Source: author\u2019s analysis.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2 id=\"8-five-criteria-for-assessing-governance\">8. Five criteria for<br \/>\nassessing governance<\/h2>\n<p>Institutional reform should be assessed against explicit criteria;<br \/>\notherwise, debate risks being reduced to preferences about<br \/>\norganisational form. The following matrix can be applied both to the<br \/>\ncurrent architecture and to reform scenarios.<\/p>\n<div class=\"matrix\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr class=\"header\">\n<th><strong>Criterion<\/strong><\/th>\n<th><strong>Core question<\/strong><\/th>\n<th><strong>Risk where weak<\/strong><\/th>\n<th><strong>Possible indicators<\/strong><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr class=\"odd\">\n<td><strong>Relevance<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Does the architecture address current needs and obligations?<\/td>\n<td>Structures without added value; disconnected priorities<\/td>\n<td>Risk coverage; consistency with obligations; territorial needs<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"even\">\n<td><strong>Coherence<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Do policies, mandates, budgets and financing converge?<\/td>\n<td>Overlaps, contradictions and blind spots<\/td>\n<td>Intersectoral protocols; common results framework; compatible<br \/>\nplans<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"odd\">\n<td><strong>Effectiveness<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Do arrangements deliver the intended results?<\/td>\n<td>Numerous activities with limited effects<\/td>\n<td>Response times; coverage; quality; outcomes for children<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"even\">\n<td><strong>Efficiency<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Are resources used without avoidable duplication?<\/td>\n<td>Transaction costs and parallel systems<\/td>\n<td>Shared functions; coordination costs; duplication removed<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"odd\">\n<td><strong>Accountability<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Who is answerable for what, and on what basis?<\/td>\n<td>Diffuse responsibility<\/td>\n<td>Named responsible authorities; indicators; reviews; publication of<br \/>\nresults<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h2 id=\"9-comparing-four-institutional-scenarios\">9. Comparing four<br \/>\ninstitutional scenarios<\/h2>\n<p>Creating a new entity should never be treated as an end in itself. It<br \/>\nmust be compared with less costly or less disruptive alternatives. Four<br \/>\nscenarios warrant consideration.<\/p>\n<p>The first is a strengthened status quo: retain the current<br \/>\nspecialised directorate while increasing its resources, clarifying its<br \/>\nmandate and improving coordination mechanisms. Its principal advantage<br \/>\nis institutional restraint. Its limitation is that additional resources<br \/>\nwithout a change in positioning may leave arbitration and accountability<br \/>\nconstraints unresolved.<\/p>\n<p>The second is a strengthened interministerial mechanism located at a<br \/>\nhigh political or administrative level, responsible for setting<br \/>\npriorities, monitoring results and arbitrating differences. This<br \/>\nscenario can reinforce a whole-of-government approach, but its<br \/>\neffectiveness depends heavily on a permanent technical secretariat,<br \/>\nadequate resources and authoritative decisions. Coordination mechanisms<br \/>\nwithout resources or arbitration capacity can quickly become<br \/>\nintermittent.<\/p>\n<p>The third scenario is a Directorate-General for the Promotion of<br \/>\nChild Rights and Child Protection. This option keeps the function within<br \/>\ncentral government, facilitates alignment with the State budget and<br \/>\ncould bring together under one strategic leadership functions that are<br \/>\ncurrently dispersed: policy development, coordination, data, quality<br \/>\nassurance, territorial delivery and partnerships. It would be justified<br \/>\nonly if it genuinely rationalised existing structures rather than<br \/>\nbecoming an additional administrative layer.<\/p>\n<p>The fourth scenario is a national agency. This option offers<br \/>\nmanagerial autonomy and may be suitable for highly operational mandates.<br \/>\nSenegalese law on implementing agencies, however, requires an<br \/>\nopportunity and impact assessment, reflecting the legislature\u2019s<br \/>\nintention to prevent overlap and the proliferation of parallel entities.<br \/>\nFor a primarily strategic, normative and interministerial function, an<br \/>\nagency could displace the coordination problem rather than solve it,<br \/>\nunless a highly specific operational mandate justified its autonomy<br \/>\n(Republic of Senegal, 2009; Republic of Senegal, 2022).<\/p>\n<div class=\"matrix\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr class=\"header\">\n<th><strong>Scenario<\/strong><\/th>\n<th><strong>Main advantage<\/strong><\/th>\n<th><strong>Main risk<\/strong><\/th>\n<th><strong>Condition for success<\/strong><\/th>\n<th><strong>Analytical assessment<\/strong><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr class=\"odd\">\n<td><strong>Strengthened status quo<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Limited institutional cost<\/td>\n<td>Insufficient arbitration authority<\/td>\n<td>Clear mandate, resources and interfaces<\/td>\n<td>Appropriate if the main constraint is capacity<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"even\">\n<td><strong>Strengthened interministerial mechanism<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Whole-of-government perspective<\/td>\n<td>Intermittent operation<\/td>\n<td>Permanent secretariat, arbitration mandate and annual review<\/td>\n<td>A potentially necessary cross-cutting complement; sufficiency<br \/>\ndepends on mandate, resources and permanence<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"odd\">\n<td><strong>Directorate-general<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Identifiable administrative leadership<\/td>\n<td>Addition of a further layer<\/td>\n<td>Merger or rationalisation of functions and a cross-cutting<br \/>\nmandate<\/td>\n<td>A strong option for strategic leadership, subject to functional,<br \/>\norganisational and budgetary audit<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"even\">\n<td><strong>National agency<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Managerial and operational autonomy<\/td>\n<td>Parallel structures and overheads<\/td>\n<td>Specific operational mandate and impact assessment<\/td>\n<td>To be reserved for a clearly demonstrated need for autonomous<br \/>\nimplementation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<section class=\"visual\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"Four institutional scenarios\">\n<h3>Four institutional scenarios<\/h3>\n<p class=\"sub\">Options should be compared against explicit governance criteria<\/p>\n<div class=\"cards\">\n<div class=\"card\">Strengthened status quo<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Strengthened interministerial mechanism<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Directorate-general<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">National agency<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"arrow\">\u2193<\/div>\n<div class=\"bar\">Relevance \u00b7 Coherence \u00b7 Effectiveness \u00b7 Efficiency \u00b7 Accountability<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<p><em>Figure 6. Four institutional scenarios for strengthening<br \/>\ngovernance \u2014 Source: A\u00cfWARA analysis, 2026.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2\nid=\"10-recommended-option-strengthen-the-states-strategic-leadership\">10.<br \/>\nRecommended option: strengthen the State\u2019s strategic leadership<\/h2>\n<p>The analysis points towards a target architecture based on one<br \/>\nprinciple: the State should retain clear strategic leadership while each<br \/>\nsector remains fully responsible for its mandate. Reform should not seek<br \/>\nto absorb justice, health, education, civil registration, social<br \/>\nprotection or territorial action into a single structure. It should<br \/>\ngovern their interdependencies, clarify responsibilities and establish a<br \/>\ncentre able to consolidate results.<\/p>\n<p>At a minimum, this governance level should perform seven functions:<br \/>\n(1) normative monitoring and follow-up of child-rights commitments; (2)<br \/>\nplanning and a common results framework; (3) intersectoral coordination<br \/>\nand arbitration mechanisms; (4) quality standards, protocols and<br \/>\ncontinuity of pathways; (5) data consolidation, monitoring and<br \/>\nevaluation, and publication of results; (6) territorial delivery and<br \/>\nsupport to local mechanisms; and (7) structured dialogue with partners<br \/>\nand mapping of financing.<\/p>\n<p>The model can be summarised in one rule: one national policy, one<br \/>\nidentifiable institutional lead, one common results framework, one<br \/>\nconsolidated map of financing and one annual review bringing together<br \/>\nthe State, sectors, territories and partners. This is consistent with<br \/>\nthe principles of effective development co-operation: country ownership,<br \/>\na focus on results, inclusive partnerships, transparency and mutual<br \/>\naccountability.<\/p>\n<p>Within this framework, a directorate-general is a robust<br \/>\ninstitutional option for functions that are principally strategic and<br \/>\nadministrative: leadership, standards, planning, coordination, data,<br \/>\nmonitoring and dialogue with partners. It cannot, however, be selected<br \/>\nsolely because the sector is important. A functional, organisational and<br \/>\nbudgetary audit must compare costs, identify competencies to be<br \/>\nrationalised, determine which interfaces can be simplified and assess<br \/>\nadded value against a strengthened status quo or a permanently resourced<br \/>\ninterministerial mechanism. A national agency would become relevant only<br \/>\nif an autonomous implementation function, distinct from the State\u2019s<br \/>\nstrategic and regulatory responsibilities, were objectively<br \/>\ndemonstrated.<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Why a directorate-general<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Because the functions requiring reinforcement are primarily<br \/>\nstrategic, normative and administrative: strategic leadership, planning,<br \/>\ncoordination, data, quality standards, territorial delivery, monitoring<br \/>\nand evaluation, and dialogue with partners. An agency would be<br \/>\npreferable only if a distinct need for autonomous implementation were<br \/>\ndemonstrated. The directorate-general must result from the<br \/>\nrationalisation of existing functions, not their accumulation.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<section class=\"visual\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"Core functions of an effective architecture\">\n<h3>Core functions of an effective architecture<\/h3>\n<p class=\"sub\">Strategic leadership without displacing sector responsibilities<\/p>\n<div class=\"cards\">\n<div class=\"card\">Normative monitoring<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Planning<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Coordination and arbitration<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Quality standards<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Data and M&amp;E<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Territorial delivery<\/div>\n<div class=\"card\">Partnerships and financing<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"arrow\">\u2193<\/div>\n<div class=\"bar\">One policy \u00b7 One institutional lead \u00b7 One results framework \u00b7 One annual review<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<p><em>Figure 7. Core functions of an effective governance architecture<br \/>\n\u2014 Source: author\u2019s analysis.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2 id=\"11-three-necessary-shifts\">11. Three necessary shifts<\/h2>\n<h2 id=\"start-with-functions-not-the-organisational-chart\">Start with<br \/>\nfunctions, not the organisational chart<\/h2>\n<p>Reform should not begin with the question \u201cwhat structure should be<br \/>\ncreated?\u201d but with \u201cwhich public functions are not being performed<br \/>\nadequately?\u201d This reversal is methodologically essential. It prevents<br \/>\nreflexive institution-building and requires the intended added value to<br \/>\nbe documented. It also allows rationalisation: some functions may be<br \/>\ncombined, others should remain sectoral, and others may be assigned to<br \/>\ninterministerial mechanisms.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"account-for-results-not-merely-coordinate-actors\">Account for<br \/>\nresults, not merely coordinate actors<\/h2>\n<p>Coordination should be assessed by its effects. An intersectoral<br \/>\nmeeting has value only if it resolves practical problems: referral<br \/>\ntimes, data-sharing, territorial coverage, budget arbitration, standards<br \/>\nof care and responses to emerging risks. Governance should therefore be<br \/>\norganised around a limited number of national and territorial results<br \/>\nwith identifiable responsible authorities and indicators.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"consolidate-the-system-not-a-succession-of-projects\">Consolidate<br \/>\nthe system, not a succession of projects<\/h2>\n<p>International co-operation should strengthen sustainable national<br \/>\ncapacity. This requires mapping financing, adopting common indicators,<br \/>\nincreasing the use of national systems and maintaining regular dialogue<br \/>\non underfunded areas, duplication and post-project sustainability. The<br \/>\nsame principle applies to innovation: a partner-funded pilot should be<br \/>\ninstitutionalised only after its relevance, cost, transferability and<br \/>\nsustainability have been assessed.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"12-conclusion\">12. Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>Senegal does not lack actors working for children. It has a national<br \/>\nstrategy, specialised professionals, territorial mechanisms, a dedicated<br \/>\ndirectorate, a specialised directorate-general within the Ministry of<br \/>\nJustice, sector services and major partners. The diagnosis concerns<br \/>\ngovernance: how can this institutional plurality be converted into<br \/>\ncoherence, continuity of services and accountability for shared results?<br \/>\nThe Committee on the Rights of the Child\u2019s 2024 concluding observations<br \/>\nreinforce this diagnosis by focusing explicitly on intersectoral<br \/>\ncoordination, budget traceability, data and the resourcing of competent<br \/>\nstructures.<\/p>\n<p>The 2026 budget aggregation, the distribution of functions across<br \/>\nsectors and the diversity of external support do not, individually,<br \/>\nprove that a directorate-general or national agency is required. Taken<br \/>\ntogether, however, they justify a thorough assessment of the current<br \/>\narchitecture. The central issue is not the creation of an additional<br \/>\nstructure, but the restoration of a centre of strategic leadership able<br \/>\nto set direction, harmonise action, monitor delivery and account for<br \/>\nresults.<\/p>\n<p>Any appropriate reform should therefore respect a rule of<br \/>\ninstitutional caution: create only what demonstrably reduces<br \/>\nfragmentation. On that condition, stronger national leadership for child<br \/>\nrights and child protection can become not a reform of the<br \/>\norganisational chart, but a reform of public-sector performance and<br \/>\naccountability to children.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"essential-references\">Essential references<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Christensen, T. &amp; L\u00e6greid, P. (2007). <em>The<br \/>\nWhole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform<\/em>. Public<br \/>\nAdministration Review, 67(6), 1059\u20131066.<\/li>\n<li>Committee on the Rights of the Child (2024). <em>Concluding<br \/>\nobservations on the combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of<br \/>\nSenegal<\/em> (CRC\/C\/SEN\/CO\/6-7).<\/li>\n<li>Ministry of Finance and Budget (2025, 2026). 2025 budget<br \/>\nimplementation documents and 2026 initial Finance Bill.<\/li>\n<li>OECD (2005, 2011, 2019). Paris Declaration; Busan Partnership;<br \/>\n<em>Governance as an SDG Accelerator<\/em>.<\/li>\n<li>Peters, B. G. (1998, 2015). Research on horizontal coordination and<br \/>\npublic management.<\/li>\n<li>Provan, K. G. &amp; Kenis, P. (2008). <em>Modes of Network<br \/>\nGovernance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness<\/em>. Journal of<br \/>\nPublic Administration Research and Theory, 18(2), 229\u2013252.<\/li>\n<li>Republic of Senegal (2009, 2022, 2026). Framework laws on agencies<br \/>\nand the parastatal sector; Decree No. 2026-1133 of 1 June 2026.<\/li>\n<li>African Union (1990). <em>African Charter on the Rights and Welfare<br \/>\nof the Child<\/em>.<\/li>\n<li>UNICEF (2021, 2023, 2024). Child Protection Strategy; child<br \/>\nprotection systems strengthening; Senegal Country Programme<br \/>\n2024\u20132028.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2 id=\"about-the-author\">About the author<\/h2>\n<p>Mamadou KEBE is a child rights and child protection expert, public<br \/>\npolicy analyst and founder of A\u00cfWARA. A former national director for<br \/>\nchild rights and child protection, he works on policy analysis, training<br \/>\nand support concerning human rights, social protection and children.<\/p>\n<\/article>\n<p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A\u00cfWARA analyse la gouvernance des droits et de la protection de l\u2019enfant au S\u00e9n\u00e9gal, compare quatre sc\u00e9narios institutionnels et identifie les conditions d\u2019un syst\u00e8me int\u00e9gr\u00e9, performant et redevable.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","_seopress_robots_follow":"","_seopress_robots_imageindex":"","_seopress_robots_snippet":"","_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"","_seopress_robots_breadcrumbs":"","_seopress_robots_freeze_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_custom_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_canonical":"","_seopress_social_fb_title":"","_seopress_social_fb_desc":"","_seopress_social_fb_img":"","_seopress_social_fb_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_height":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_title":"","_seopress_social_twitter_desc":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_height":0,"_seopress_redirections_value":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled_regex":"","_seopress_redirections_logged_status":"","_seopress_redirections_param":"","_seopress_redirections_type":0,"_seopress_analysis_target_kw":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-635","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aiwara-strategies"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/635","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=635"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/635\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":663,"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/635\/revisions\/663"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=635"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=635"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aiwara.africa\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=635"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}