In New York, ballots are accumulating without yet producing the political agreement the process requires. Five informal consultations have tested the candidates seeking to succeed António Guterres; none has publicly established institutional convergence. The central question is no longer how to read a provisional ranking, but how powers with divergent preferences might agree on a figure expected to embody the general interest of the United Nations.
A competition shaped by shifting coalitions
The results of the fifth poll, held on 7 October, illustrate how fluid support remains. Rebeca Grynspan received nine “encourage” votes, down from ten in the previous round; Rafael Grossi received six, after eight; and Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett fell from eight to five. Macky Sall remained on five “encourage” votes, while his “discourage” votes rose to ten. Reuters and PassBlue reported these figures on the basis of diplomatic sources; the Security Council has not officially published candidate-by-candidate results [1] [2] [3].
The chart below compares four candidates’ trajectories across the last three rounds. It shows fluctuations, not a hierarchy of their chances of appointment: an informal “encourage” vote is neither an irrevocable promise nor a vote secured in the formal recommendation.
The power to block is not the power to build consensus
George Tsebelis summarises the veto-player mechanism as follows: “The more veto players you have, the more difficult it is to change the status quo” [4]. This proposition, expressed in a 2013 interview, helps explain why agreement is difficult when actors’ preferences diverge. It does not mean that the five permanent members alone constitute a majority. It distinguishes the power to prevent an outcome from the ability to build a common decision.
In the UN process, a formal recommendation requires at least nine affirmative votes and no negative vote from a permanent member. The five permanent members cannot, by themselves, reach the nine-vote threshold. The ten elected members therefore retain a decisive role in building a coalition. This dual requirement separates the ability to block a candidacy from the ability to produce a collective agreement.
Washington and the language of commitments
According to press reports published in early October, Washington would like other profiles to emerge and would give a central place to UN reform. These reports are neither an official announcement of a veto against every candidate nor an established map of US preferences. They suggest instead that the discussion also concerns the commitments expected of the next Secretary-General: governance, spending, efficiency and the institution’s autonomy [5].
Thomas Schelling wrote that “in bargaining, weakness is often strength” [6]. The line comes from an analysis of commitments that deliberately limit freedom of choice. It does not mean that a low number of votes helps a candidate. It reminds us that a negotiating position also depends on the credibility of commitments and the concessions available.
Firm positions do not necessarily mean that negotiations are over. They may also lead actors to seek an option acceptable to several capitals, even if it is not any one of their first choices.
The search for a point of convergence
Three developments deserve attention. First, opposition within the Council may become clearer. PassBlue reports that the next straw poll is scheduled for 16 October and may use colour-coded ballots; this arrangement is not officially confirmed [3]. Second, new candidates could enter the race, changing the space for compromise without guaranteeing agreement. Third, discussions on UN reform could produce specific commitments on the next Secretary-General’s independence, resources and priorities.
African countries have reason to follow this process beyond the nationalities of the candidates. The question also concerns the political mandate, resources and autonomy that major powers will accept for the next Secretary-General. A compromise candidate should not be confused with a candidate who lacks the capacity to act.
As 1 January 2027 approaches, the selection tests a fundamental tension within the UN: choosing an authority able to speak for all through a negotiation dominated by a few. The next poll may not reveal the successor’s name. It could, however, make the conditions for agreement clearer.
References and method
- Security Council Report, “Fifth Security Council Straw Poll on UN Secretary-General Candidates”, 6 October 2026 (updated after the poll).
- Reuters, “Costa Rica’s Grynspan ahead in race to be next UN chief, sources say”, 7 October 2026.
- PassBlue, “Big Shakeup in Latest Security Council Votes on UN SecGen Race”, 7 October 2026.
- George Tsebelis, interview with Dylan Matthews, “Why Congress can’t seem to get anything done”, The Washington Post, 26 January 2013; see also Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton University Press, 2002.
- SABC News, “Trump administration opposes candidates for new UN Chief”, 10 October 2026, reporting information attributed to Politico; see also public US statements on UN reform.
- Thomas C. Schelling, “An Essay on Bargaining”, The American Economic Review, vol. 46, no. 3, 1956, pp. 281–306, at p. 282; reprinted in The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1960.